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Transhumanism is an ideological movement that advo-
cates the enhancement of human intellectual and phys-
ical capacities through technological modification. 
Since it burst in the scene in the 1990s, its popularity 
has grown in inverse proportion to its relevance. How-
ever, I believe that transhumanism has already failed to 
convince us that we must radically transform the hu-
man condition, and its failure can offer some valuable 
reflections on the topic of human enhancement (HE).
Transhumanists talk about transcendence, overcoming 
nature, and fulfilling human potentials. We will take the 
reins of our own evolution to the point we will become 
“better than human”. Some believe that posthumanity 
itself is the goal of the transhumanist project, while 
others claim that it will be the natural outcome of pur-
suing values that we already hold dear. In both cases, 
posthumanity is conceived as a beneficial state we 
should actively strive to make a reality. The politics of 
transhumanism is largely libertarian and exalts the 
 sacred autonomy of the self. But libertarianism has 
some trouble legitimating modifications done to future 
others: the type of inherited, irreversible changes that 
will drive directed evolution (such as those resulting 
from germline engineering). This is why it is necessary 
to argue for a future, collective benefit, and posthuman-
ity comes in to fill the gap.
The first, most obvious objection to this view is that the 
notion of augmenting or enhancing capacities seems to 
rely on the same fixed, normative notion of ‘human na-
ture’ that transhumanists so desperately want to dis-
pense with. As a way of a response, the transhumanist 
resorts to a Promethean view of the human as lacking 
any natural determination. If human existence pre-
cedes its essence, then we can remake ourselves in 
view of values we freely choose. Yet, in this gambit, hu-
man no-nature simply comes to play the same ontolog-
ical and normative role as nature (see: [4]). As a result, 
the argument quickly plunges into a fallacy analogous 
to the naturalistic one, in the sense that normative con-
clusions are derived from descriptive premises about 
our existential constitution: having no essence is 
thought of as if it were a sort of essence. 
Transhumanism needs a theory of values that con-
vinces us that values are sufficiently universal to make 
posthumanity the conceivable and beneficial outcome 
of our present choices. Nick Bostrom argues that trans-
humanist values (higher intelligence, longevity, physi-
cal and psychological capacities, etc.) are “intrinsic” 
([1], p. 501; [2]). The problem is that an intrinsic good 
has value in itself, and it is worth pursuing even if it has 
dreadful consequences. Do we value intelligence for its 
own sake or because of the benefits it brings? Enhance-
ments are instrumental goods, which means that en-
hanced capacities and beneficence (or virtue) are not 
causally aligned. A good life is the result of individual 
choices, circumstances and contexts, rather than of any 
specific set of capacities.
At this point, the transhumanist could argue for a con-
ventional view: what matters is that values are shared, 
and it is enough that we all agree on them. The prob-
lem is that HE options will be assessed and adopted in 
diverse contexts and value frameworks. It is likely that 
individuals and cultures will not converge on a com-
mon use of genetic engineering technologies because 
there are no common conceptions of the good that hold 
across them. Transhumanists need to convince us that 
posthumanity represents a foreseeable and conceiv-
able benefit. However, there is no way to calculate the 
aggregate result of these choices. The values that trans-
humanists defend are suspiciously culturally specific, 
yet their model of valuation has claims to universality: 
values are the result of rational consideration by an 
 individual or collective in an ideal context of free and 
informed deliberation. As Imelda de Melo-Martín [3] 
writes, arguments on both transhuman and biocon-
servative sides “commit the error of assuming that 
our biological traits and behaviors can be evaluated 
outside of the environmental, social and political con-
texts in which such traits and behaviours are ex-
press ed” (p. 201). Values are also highly context-sensi-
tive; changes in context lead to changes in values, and 
this frustrates even short-range attempts at evaluating 
the costs and benefits of any proposed technology. We 
cannot calculate benefits on the basis of existing values 
because enhancements create new frameworks that 
change these values, to the extent of imposing values 
that a person might not have otherwise endorsed. 
Posthumanity cannot be an intelligible reason, let alone 
a good one, to take a proactive approach. We can also 
question some foundational assumptions. Transhu-
manists are fixated on new technologies; Bostrom even 
argues that access to new HE technologies is a moral 
urgency (see: [1], p. 499; [2], p. 11). This commitment 
to novelty is a central but questionable value choice. 
Viewpoint
 Bioethica Forum / 2015 / Volume 8 / No. 1 24
ETHIK IN DER BIOTECHNOLOGIE / ETHIQUE ET BIOTECHNOLOGIE / ETHICS IN BIOTECHNOLOGIES
advisor? Transhumanists leave us in the dark. Pres-
ently, legal experts, biotechnologists, policy makers, 
and health care professionals are turning their atten-
tion to much more restricted and urgent questions sur-
rounding HE. As debates on HE enter this mature 
stage, transhumanism has become a quaint cultural 
 artifact that one day we may regard with quaint nostal-
gia – the same way we now regard Marinetti’s Futur-
ism or Gernsback-era pulp science fiction.
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Take away the focus on shiny hi-tech and transhuman-
ism begins to look a lot like ordinary ‘humanism’ – and 
this is precisely its point. Although, in principle, tradi-
tional means of suffering alleviation are not ruled out, 
you never hear transhumanists arguing for these. Ad-
vocating Third World debt relief, equitable distribution 
of resources, or universal health care does not make 
you a transhumanist – even though these means of ‘en-
hancement’ may achieve beneficial results much more 
widely, quickly, and effectively. Thus the transhumanist 
project commits us to the prioritization, not just of new 
technologies, but of certain human groups over others. 
It asks us to put the interests of future beneficiaries of 
these technologies above those of populations presently 
suffering the afflictions of war, famine, oppression and 
poverty. 
The exclusive focus of transhumanism has been on the 
naturalization of the idea of HE in abstracto. However, 
once we recognize that there is nothing immoral or 
problematic with the idea of HE itself, transhumanism 
offers no concrete guidelines, standards or models for 
addressing the pressing, real questions of implementa-
tion. Obviously not all enhancements will be beneficial 
to all people in all circumstances. How to enhance, 
who, and in which conditions? What would be a ‘trans-
humanist’ approach to the complex issues regarding li-
ability, legal frameworks, insurance policies, and health 
funding models? Is there a specifically transhumanist 
approach to, say, the role of the health professional as 
